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By mid-2006, for the first time in almost half a century, all actors and observers of the 
Cuban drama that has attracted the attention of a wide spectrum of the world’s public 
opinion were in agreement. All breathed a sort of a mix of expectation, calm, anguish, and 
hope in front of the moderately imminent biological (as the term is customarily used in 
Cuba) ending of at least the current political leadership. What was not actually expected 
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was that the vigil was going to end so suddenly and not exactly for the terminal reason 
(the death of Castro) that most feared or hoped for. What it was less clear then and it is 
less clear now, of course, is the doubt consisting in deciphering if this chapter of the 
recent history of Cuba will also represent a drastic change of regime. In other words, the 
ultimate questions was not only ‘and now, what?’ What was demanded was to know if all 
the uncertainty created by Castro’s illness was going to end in a succession or a 
transition. In this context, each sector, actor and observer has performed according to 
individual or group needs and desires. 
 
Although most observers would agree that something important was commencing to 
develop in Cuba in mid 2006, differences in analysis and political views rested basically 
on the fact if this change to come was going to be a succession or a transition. In other 
words, on the one hand, the bets were off for either predicting a synchronized change in 
the leadership according to the legislation in place, with Raúl Castro taking over the 
powers bestowed by his brother Fidel, or for a transitory outcome. The alternative 
contemplated was to be a brief interlude in the direction of a true transition to a different 
kind of political regime. 
 
According to numerous signals coming from Havana, all the pieces in the puzzle seemed 
to be prepared (‘atado y bien atado’, tied up and well tied up, as the official saying went 
on during the last years of the Franco regime) for the effective Cuban succession, even 
when now no one seemed to know if that plan would lead to a provisional leadership by 
Raúl Castro, as it was in fact announced when the sudden illness and surgery of Fidel 
Castro were announced and then his brother took his temporary place. The alternative, a 
collective power wielded by the party, was on the horizon. 
 
In any case, in the context of EU-Cuba relations, the prevalent atmosphere was in a state 
of stillness.3 The United States and the anti-Castro interests were engaging in another 
cyclical round of hardening of the economic and political measures against Cuba that 
were initiated by the embargo imposed as a retaliation for the expropriations executed in 
the early days of the Cuban revolution. Meanwhile, diverse European Union collective 
interests and individual governments seemed to be inexorably coming to the conclusion, 
with some sense of realistic resignation, that their efforts for a long policy of constructive 
engagement with the Cuban regime and the society at large were not receiving the 
expected results. ‘Welcome to the club’, was the collective assessment in Washington 
and European capitals. 
 
However, while the US-Cuba confrontation appeared to be characterized by another 
variation of the old-fashioned Cold War methods (at least in its verbal and show business 
appearances), the European-Cuban relationship were tinged by a peculiar and special 
touch of admirable stubbornness, as definite as the attitude expressed by the United 
States and Cuba to each other for over four decades. The difference this time was that 
the Europe-Cuba relationship was doomed for frustration, not by a sentiment of irritation 
from the part of the European Union at the hardening of the human rights behavior 
executed by Castro, but by a sense of ‘mutual irrelevancy’4 that apparently characterized 
both strategies (if one can label the European and Cuban attitudes as such). 
                                                 
3 The official assessment of Cuba-EU relations is succinctly exposed in the documentation provided by the 
DG-Development of the European Commision, in charge of the dossier of the relationship with that country. In 
contrast with all the rest of the Latin American countries (with the exception of the Dominican Republic), 
whose relationship with the EU is regulated though the DG-External Relations, Cuba, lacking a development 
cooperation agreement, is still a candidate to be inserted in the ACP network benefiting of the former Lomé 
Convention and now the Cotonou Agreement, along the other Caribbean countries, including the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti. For detailed documentation, see the website (unaltered since 5 August 2005): 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/country/country_home_en.cfm?cid=cu&status=new
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Both actors seemed (and still are) to be convinced that they had exhausted all moves to 
influence each other. Both appeared to be content (or at least placidly resigned) with the 
evidence that, no matter how much they try (or don’t try), there is no chance for an 
important change in their corresponding behavior. For the European Union this diagnosis 
does not seem to appear to be negative, because the record shows that Brussels has 
tried to influence, persuade, and, in a subtle manner, to coerce Havana in a given future 
political direction, aiming mostly at preparing the country for changes after the end of the 
current political system. For Cuba, the stalemate has to be read as a triumph, even at the 
price of not receiving some expected benefits for a mild reform in behavior. Showing that 
facing the European Union and some powerful European actors has political returns. It is 
therefore valued at a much higher level that submitting to negotiation and compromise.5
 
This apparently well-set scenario that dominates the European-Cuban relationship when 
the Castro regime was approaching its fiftieth anniversary and the leader was ready to 
surpass his 80th birthday has developed from a series of trends, events, and tactics that 
evolved parallel to the more tumultuous, at times dangerous and bordering on war, 
relationship between the United States and Cuba since 1959. The ups and downs of the 
European-Cuban link are, to a large extend, collateral damage and appendices of a 
deeper and more complex relationship between Havana and Washington. For the most 
part, the European motions towards Cuba have been the result of reactions to the US 
policy, although some European actors have had a long historical linkage with the 
Caribbean nation, such is the notorious and special case of Spain.6 This ‘special 
relationship’ is constantly present in the analytical framework of Spanish observers and 
scholars, with the result that reality and historical facts are filtered through the particular 
lenses of the direct witnesses and researchers.7
 
This stalemate is aptly illustrated by the evolution of what has to be considered as the 
most critical confrontation between the European Union and Cuba in decades, leading to 
                                                 
5 Of the previous papers and chapters mentioned in note 1, one has to be considered as the most updated 
regarding this issue, covering until the beginning of the change of course in EU policy in 2004: ‘The European 
Union and Cuba in the aftermath of Castro’s “fall”’, occasional paper, Miami European Union Center/Jean 
Monnet Chair, vol. 10, nr 14, October 2004, http://www.miami.edu/eucenter/roycubafinal.pdf
6 The following books by this author deal with topics on the relationship between Cuba and Spain. For a 
selection of my publications on the relationship between Spain and Cuba: Josep Conangla i Fontanilles, La 
Constitució de l'Havana i altres escrits, Edicions de La Magrana/Diputació de Barcelona, Barcelona, 1986; 
Catalunya a Cuba, Editorial Barcino/Fundació Jaume I, Barcelona, 1988, preface by Pere Grases; Cuba y 
España: relaciones y percepciones, Biblioteca Cubana Contemporánea, Madrid, 1988; El espacio 
iberoamericano: dimensiones y percepciones de la relación especial entre España y América Latina, with Juan 
Antonio March, Instituto de Estudios Ibéricos/Centro de Estudios Internacionales, Miami/Barcelona, 1996, 
(chapter: ‘España y Cuba: Una relación muy especial’ and ‘Posdata’); The Ibero-American Space: Dimensions 
and Perceptions of the Special Relationship Between Spain and Latin America, with Albert Galinsoga (eds.), 
Iberian Studies Institute, ‘Jean Monnet’ Chair for European Integration, University of Lleida, 1997 (chapter: ‘Spain 
and Cuba: a very special relationship’ and ‘ Postscript’); Josep Conangla y Fontanilles. Memorias de mi juventud 
en Cuba durante la guerra (1895-1898), Ediciones Península, Barcelona, 1998, annotated edition and 
introduction; La siempre fiel: un siglo de relaciones hispanocubanas (1898-1998), Los Libros de la 
Catarata/Instituto Universitario de Desarrollo y Cooperación, Universidad Complutense, Madrid, 1999; Josep 
Conangla i Fontanilles: Patriarca del nacionalisme catalá a Cuba, Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona/Tarragona, 
1999; Cuba, the United States and the Helms-Burton Doctrine: International Reactions, University Press of 
Florida, Gainesville, 2000, http://www.upf.com/book.asp?id=ROYXXS00
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7 In addition to the standard academic literature (see previous papers mentioned in introductory note), some 
unusual pieces of direct Spanish witnesses of the recent Cuban developments are worth consideration. 
Among them, not only for its content, but because it follows in a diary method a chronological order of the 
period studied in this monograph, see the book authored by former TVE correspondent in Havana, José 
Manuel Martín Medem, ¿Por qué no me enseñaste cómo se vive sin ti?  (El Viejo Topo, Madrid, 2005). 
Although it deals with events of the period previous to the term of this paper, it is advisable to review the 
commentaries made by Martín Medem’s predecessor in Havana, Vicenç Sanclemente, in his book entitled La 
Habana no es una isla: crónica de un corresponsal en Cuba (Jaque Mate, Barcelona, 2002). For a critical 
evaluation of the fascination generated by Cuba on the minds of the Spanish intellectuals, see the article by 
Antonio Elorza, ‘Cuba desde España: el espejismo’, Letras Libres, September 2004, 
http://www.letraslibres.com/index.php?art=9889
Area: Latin America – WP 16/2006 
August 2006 
a softening of the attitudes and offerings on the part of the EU, with no evidential results 
and rewards given by the Cuban regime. Far from resorting to the battle lines, both sides 
seemed to have preferred to agree on a modus vivendi8 that, while it does not satisfy 
anybody, it serves at least as a platform for not to worsen the situation. 
 
The series of moves started with a deep consideration that the temporary measures taken 
by the EU in mid 2003, as a retaliation for acts considered as violation of human rights 
executed by the Cuban regime, were delivering counterproductive results which did not 
benefit anybody, possibly with the exception of the satisfaction of hardliners in the Cuban 
exile community and the US government. By expecting the Cuban regime to submit to the 
persuasion first and then to the punishment for unbecoming behavior, the European 
diplomatic machinery was shut off and became ineffective in minimally acting in support of 
the dissident movement it meant to benefit. Brussels saw that it became the victim of the 
same symptom that has affected the US interests through the 40-plus years of the 
embargo and isolation policy. 
 
2. Change of Course: Back to ‘Constructive Engagement’ 
 
Not convinced that a change of policy would render the expected results, the European 
Union decided in mid 2004, less than a year after the imposition of temporary measures 
(known as ‘sanctions’ by outsiders, but a term never used in the EU context), to suspend 
them and revert the official attitude to the basic three-fold strategy in existence since the 
mid 1990s when the EU adopted the Common Position on Cuba. First, it stated 
disagreement with the political and economic system of Cuba. However, the EU 
expressed opposition to the US embargo, and most especially to its collateral measures 
regarding potential retaliation against outside interests dealing with Cuba. Finally, it 
conditioned an improvement of the EU-Cuba relationship and the expected benefit 
derived from programs of development cooperation to the implementation of a substantial 
reform in the Cuban legal and political system and a policy of respect for human rights. 
 
This scene has to be properly framed within the context of the first stormy part of 1996 
when the prospects of a rapprochement between the European Union and the United 
States were optimistic. Simultaneously the troubles for the passing of the Helms-Burton 
act9 (aimed at punishing European investment in Cuba) ended abruptly when Castro 
ordered on 24 February 1996, the criminal shot down of two Brothers to the Rescue 
airplanes that recklessly had been overflying Cuban territory.10 In the fall, after the victory 
of the Popular Party led by José María Aznar, the new Spanish government took the lead 
in the EU and managed to get the Common Position approved, a first imposed on any 
other country. Reinforced by the measures (‘sanctions’) in 2003, this time the EU decided 
to get rid of them and then deal with the approach to be taken with the dissident 
movement and official participation in events taking place in Cuba for the sake of 
strengthening the communication with the Cuban government and society at large. 
 
The preparations for this mild reform of the official attitude commenced in mid 2004. 
Although the topic was largely discussed and debated during the previous months, the 
change of government in Spain as a result of the March 14 election (linked to the 11 
                                                 
8 This expression was at times in the past applied to the Spain-Cuba political and economic relationship 
during the first part of the Castro regime, while Franco was in charge of Spain. Observers of the current EU-
Cuba relationship have recently adopted it in an unofficial fashion. 
9 Neutered by an escape clause given to the President and an agreement made with the EU, its 10th 
anniversary passed without fanfare on 12 March 2006. Meanwhile, numerous details of the airplane attack are 
still covered by mystery: Ariel Remos, ‘Sin resolver el asesinato de Hermanos al Rescate’, Diario las 
Américas, 22/II/2006. 
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March terrorist attack in Madrid) was also a deciding factor. Madrid took the lead in 
persuading the rest of the EU governments to consider a correction for a situation that 
was, according to the evaluation of the core of EU Council members, counterproductive 
and not to the benefit of the Cuban civil society, while diplomatic channels remained 
frozen. 
 
The Irish presidency of the EU Council ended in June 2004 with no noticeable changes. 
Several sectors of the EU institutions continued stressing the need to follow the official 
script and proceeded with campaigns to influence and to pressure the Cuban government. 
Such is the notorious case of Swedish EU Parliament Member Cecilia Malstrom, who has 
been a leader of the critical sector opposed to any amelioration of the measures taken in 
2003.11 As referred later on this commentary, Malstrom’s activity was to resurface later on 
when the EU changed course. 
 
As a sign of an unchanged situation, on 13 May 2004, the Presidency of the EU issued a 
Declaration reaffirming its condemnation for the trials of dissidents in Havana, recalling 
the Resolution adopted by the UN Commission on Human Rights of 15 April 2004, 
reminding Havana that the situation was to be weighed when the evaluation the Common 
Position was due.12 Consequently, on 14 June 2004, at the closing of the Irish leadership 
of the EU, the General Affairs Council issued its assessment expressing ‘disappointing 
lack of progress’ by the Cuban government, and ‘serious concern at the ongoing large-
scale violation of human rights in Cuba’, calling Cuba ‘to release immediately all those 
detained for political reasons’. Among other concerns, the EU expressed ‘regret at the 
imposition of new restrictions on private enterprise’, ‘condemned the unacceptable 
attitude of the Cuban government towards EU delegations in Havana’, and ‘regret at 
Cuba’s refusal of EU cooperation’. As a result ‘of the lack of progress… the Council 
reaffirmed the measures adopted on 5 June 2003’. At the same time, ‘in the context of its 
policy of constructive engagement, the EU and its Member States would also continue to 
provide support for cultural events in Cuba and would urge the Cuban authorities to avoid 
obstructing this process’.13
 
In spite of the apparent lack of substantial changes in European perceptions, the Spanish 
lead of the EU’s new course of action on Cuba became more assertive when on 9 July 
2004, Madrid named the new ambassador. Carlos Alonso Zaldívar, a career diplomat with 
previous experience in Korea and Rome, was named and confirmed, giving the Castro 
government a sense of priority when the Spanish government announced earlier that 
three important posts were designated for the initial changes. The other two were the UN 
and Morocco embassies. Simultaneously, Herick Campos, PSOE deputy and Secretary 
General of the Socialist Youth, visited Havana, with the result that the Partido Popular 
retaliated by sending its Secretary for International Relations Jorge Moragas to Cuba to 
visit Oswaldo Payá. Days after, the Cuban authorities released the only woman among 
the 75 arrested dissidents, Martha Beatriz Roque.14
 
The plans for a reformatting of the EU policy proceeded and news of the impending 
change were met by the Spanish opposition with certain measures to influence the 
discussions taking place in Brussels. The Spanish embassy prepared the way intending to 
use the reception of the national day of 12 October for announcing the new plan, with 
considerable criticism from sectors of the dissident movement and the Cuban exile 
community.15 In this contextual framework, in another of the serious incidents that could 
                                                 
11 Letter to Cuba’s ambassador to the EU, 20/III/2003. 
12 Declaration, 13/V/2004. 
13 Council of the European Union, General Affairs and External Relations, 14/VI/2004, 10189 (Presse 195). 
14For a detailed analysis of this episode, see my paper entitled ‘The European Union and Cuba in the 
aftermath of Castro’s “fall”’, op. cit., and Martín Medem, p. 222-225. 
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have had important consequences, Jorge de Moragas traveled again to Havana on a 
tourist visa. He was accompanied by two Dutch deputies, while the Netherlands had the 
EU presidency. Moragas intended to meet with representatives of the dissident movement 
and he was detained at the airport and forced to go back on the same Air France airplane 
he had taken. The Spanish government presented a protest to the Cuban authorities, and 
the incident caused considerable trouble to the Spanish embassy while it was preparing 
the ground for the change of policy.16 This incident was strategically located just before 
the Latin American Committee of the EU (COLAT) was to meet to discuss the Cuban 
issue, with the result that the debate was postponed for later in November, giving time to 
the European embassies to assess the situation.17
 
In what was to be one of the most publicly debated debuts of any Spanish ambassador to 
Cuba, Zaldívar became the center of the controversy when in the course of the reception 
for the national day of 12 October, not attended by Cuban officials who had boycotted the 
occasion, he announced that the Spanish government had decided to take the lead and 
apply what was going to be the centerpiece of the EU new approach. The new format was 
not to include invitations to be extended to the representatives of the dissident movement 
with which the national governments will have separate, periodic meetings.18 Some 
dissidents took the measures as pragmatic and others felt insulted and left the reception 
in disgust, while the Cuban exile community in Miami lambasted the Spanish 
government.19
 
Days after, news erupted about the fall suffered by Fidel Castro in Santa Clara after 
leaving the podium and concluding his speech. The incident gave considerable ground for 
speculation regarding his health.20 It was to be a precedent widely studied and then on 31 
July 2006, news came of his surgical operation and his temporary substitution in power by 
his brother. In the Spanish context, the accident of Santa Clara produced unusual 
commentaries from several PP figures. Loyola de Palacio, upon leaving her position of 
Vice President of the European Commission, said that ‘we are all waiting for Castro to 
die… because it will be the only way to change the situation and democracy to return to 
Cuba’.21 Meanwhile, the conservative majority (376 in favor, 281 against, and 26 
abstentions) of the EU Parliament approved a resolution to demand the release of all 
political prisoners in Cuba and the authorization for Oswaldo Payá to travel to Europe to 
receive the Sajarov Prize awarded to him by the Parliament.22
 
Nonetheless, in the EU-Cuba front the machinery of change was in motion. The Cuban 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs convoked (in a rather unprecedented move) the Spanish 
ambassador to announce him the ‘unfreezing’ of the conflictive relationship that prevented 
direct communications with European embassies. In spite of all difficulties and obstacles 
placed by different actors, at the year’s closing, it was obvious that the existing policy had 
exhausted all its available credibility. Brussels and several European governments had 
given explicit signals to Havana for the need of offering a hint of a gesture that would help 
the EU to change course. 
 
Consequently, a sort of olive branch was extended by the Cuban government in the form 
of the release of a dozen political prisoners, among them the prestigious poet and 
                                                 
16 Roy, ibid, p. 7-8. 
17 Roy, p. 8-9; Martín Medem, p. 250-253. 
18 Roy, p. 6-7; Martín Medem, p. 242-251. 
19 For a critical assessment of the change of the EU policy under the leadership of the Spanish government 
and the role played by the new ambassador, see: Antonio Elorza, ‘La Unión Europea y Cuba: no habrá final 
feliz’, Letras Libres, December 2004, http://www.letraslibres.com/index.php?sec=13&art=10126
20 Roy, ibid, p. 9-10. 
21 Roy, p. 9; Martín Medem, p. 255. 
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independent journalist Raúl Rivero and the economist Oscar Espinosa. While this move 
was limited in number (still the bulk of the 76 imprisoned dissidents remained in jail) and 
in concept (the ‘liberation’ was conditioned as ‘excarcelación’, in fact a house exile), EU 
circles welcomed the improvement, took a positive note and continued to pressure the 
decision makers of the national governments to match the expectations.23 While the 
conservative opposition in Spain evaluated this as a triumph for Castro, the Dutch 
government as EU presidency judged the decision as ‘encouraging’.24
 
The change of the EU presidency had, among other details, resulted in the announcement 
of the reformatting of the EU attitude. On 31 January, the General Affairs Council issued 
its conclusions deciding that ‘all measures taken on June 5, 2003’ were ‘temporarily 
suspended’. This decision was to be reviewed in six months ‘in the light of developments 
towards democratic pluralism and respect for human rights’. In detail, the Council 
terminated ‘the limitation of high-level visits’, while meetings ‘with peaceful opposition 
might be part’ of such high level visits. It also suspended ‘the reduction of the level of 
participation in cultural events’.25 As later developments would show, on 13 June 2005, 
the Council decided ‘to maintain the dialogue’ and to keep the measures suspended, in 
spite of the fact that reiterated ‘its urgent request to release unconditionally all political 
prisoners’, expressed ‘regret at the lack of any further advance since the release’ of a 
number of prisoners, and the fact that it did not detect ‘satisfactory progress on human 
rights’.26 In essence, the EU had elected to keep on trying to maintain the lines of 
communication opened, with the result that European circles and interests opposed to this 
new EU approach branded it ‘a policy of appeasement’.27 However, the semester and its 
background were not an easy scenario for what appeared to be a notable improvement in 
EU-Cuba relations. 
 
The Spanish government and EU leaders stressed the need for the change, justifying this 
move because the imposition of the ‘sanctions’ did not deliver any positive results,28 
outlining an improvement in the relationship and a noticeable decrease in the tension.29 In 
contrast with the optimistic EU assessment, the US government predicted that Cuba 
would implement an even harsher policy against the dissidents. Some of them, however, 
considered that the change would not have any effects on their situation. The US press 
stressed the division of views within the EU regarding the evolution of the Cuba issue. 
 
Divisions, contradictions and paradoxes, added to the complexity, seemed to be part of 
the overall composite label branded by all sides dealing with the new Cuba-Europe 
relationship. In essence, things had returned to ‘normal’. After a period of freezing when 
customary feelings between European, and most especially Spanish, personalities and 
interests of Cuba and Europe again were behaving as expected. When ‘normalcy’ was 
hidden behind the impasse caused by the implementation of the special measures, the 
oddity of inaction took its place. Now things returned to their usual shape. However, some 
interesting novelties were revealed, as a sign of the new times. 
 
                                                 
23 Markus Merckel et al., ‘Las relaciones de la Unión Europea con Cuba’, El País, 12/XII/2004. 
24 Martín Medem, p. 277. 
25 Press Release, 31/I/2005; Conclusion, Cuba. 
26 Council of the EU, External Relations Council Meeting, 13/VI/2005. 
27 International Society of Human Rights, 15/VI/2005; see also article by Vaclav Havel. 
28 Editorial, El País, 14/I/2005. 
 7
29 AFP, ‘Embajador español en Cuba cree que las “relaciones bilaterales se están normalizando”’, Diario las 
Américas, 25/I/2005; Mauricio Vicent, ‘O dialogamos con todos o nos tiramos los trastos a cabeza’, El País, 
24/I/2005. 
Area: Latin America – WP 16/2006 
August 2006 
3. Enlarging Frequent Miles Accounts 
 
A frenzy of significant transnational travel took the scene of Cuba-EU-Spain-US, relations. 
To start with, for example, the Cuban exile establishment had split much earlier in this EU-
Cuba development. The root of this was the disappearance of the towering figure of Jorge 
Mas Canosa, founder of the Cuban American National Foundation CANF), credited for 
most of the successes of the exiles in influencing the US policy towards Cuba, along with 
the passing of the Helm-Burton legislation. Dissatisfied with the evolution of the 
organization now led by Mas Canosa’s son, Jorge Mas Santos, important wealthy 
members left the organization and founded a rival entity, aiming to fill the place of 
lobbying US power circles. While the Spanish government avoided meetings with Jorge 
Mas in Madrid,30 as a retaliation for making public appearances before his departure 
expressing the demands he was going to present to the Spanish government, his 
contribution to a presidential inaugural gala organized by Cuban-American 
congresspeople was rejected,31 adding insult to injury. The misfortunes of the CANF 
leadership worsened when it supported the candidacy of George Bush’s rival, John Kerry, 
in the 2004 election. The CANF apparently recovered part of its international attraction 
when the crisis of Castro’s illness erupted. 
 
On the Cuban front, at times the leadership seemed to lack coordination, although this 
was most of the time due to the overwhelming protagonism executed by Fidel Castro who, 
in one of his televised interventions, lambasted the usual enemies (the United States, the 
exiles) and added… the European Union, just at the moment when the thaw of relations 
was in motion.32 It is not surprising at the same time that Cuban Foreign Minister Pérez 
Roque embarked in a well-choreographed, PR-like tour of Europe, including key 
stopovers in Madrid and Brussels, where he was warmly received by King Juan Carlos 
and top EU officials. He demanded a treatment for Cuba similar to the one received by 
other nations. However, not all was free from controversies and certain double-meaning 
message given by the Spanish government to the Cuban leadership. As will see below, 
while dissident poet Raúl Rivero was well received upon his liberation by Under Secretary 
of State Bernardino León and PSOE International Relations Secretary Trinidad Jiménez, 
Pérez Roque was received, according to strict protocol, by an airline stewardess. An in 
spite of the fact the he was later received by King Juan Carlos, Prime Minister Rodríguez 
Zapatero avoided photo opportunities with the Cuban foreign minister. Anonymous Cuban 
sources then spread the veil threat that Fidel Castro could retaliate by not attending the 
Ibero-American Summit to be held in Salamanca in the fall.33 He in fact skipped the 
gathering because of a combination of factors, as outlined below. 
 
Continuing the long tradition implemented by Spain’s regional leaders, Andalusian 
autonomous president Manuel Chaves (who is significantly the president of the PSOE) 
inaugurated the new trend of high visibility visits from Europe. He was the first important 
dignitary to arrive in Havana since the lifting of the temporary measures that banned such 
trips for 18 months. Not long afterwards the tour taken by Chaves, Raúl Castro, Fidel 
Castro’s brother and heir apparent, visited Galicia, the native land of their father. This 
highly visible visit caused many polemic commentaries mostly due to the fact that there 
was no evidence of any critical comment or special demand made by the 
ultraconservative Galician President Manuel Fraga Iribarne on the Cuban leadership 
regarding the dissident movement and the expansion of the liberating measures. This 
friendly and diplomatic pattern was in tune with past experiences by Raul’s host, who 
                                                 
30 Rui Ferreira, ‘Canciller cancela cita’, El Nuevo Herald, 15/I/2005. 
31 Lesley Clark, ‘Gala’s snub is no obstacle’, The Miami Herald, 20/I/2005. 
32 Mar Marín, ‘Castro advierte que no necesita a Europa tras giro político UE’, Diario las Américas, 3/II/2005; 
Vanessa Arrington, ‘Castro says Cuba doesn’t need US’, The Miami Herald, 3/II/2005. 
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spent part of his childhood as an immigrant in Cuba.34 As a sample of the important 
change in Cuba-Spain relations, Magdalena Alvarez, in charge of public investment, was 
the first Spanish minister to visit Havana since 1996. She signed agreements on air traffic, 
predicting a closer cooperation between the two countries.35
 
Just by coincidence but with no less significance, Raúl Castro welcomed in Santiago de 
Cuba the descendents of the Spanish Admiral Cervera, who led the Spanish Navy in the 
1898 defeat that ended the Spanish colonial presence in Cuba. The Cuban leader used 
the occasion to express unlimited admiration for the gallantry of the Spanish military in 
executing an impossible mission facing the US forces.36 This mutual personal feeling 
(Fraga’s friendly attitude for a son of a Galician, and Raúl’s reverence for the Spanish 
colonial military) constantly surfaces in the Spanish-Cuban relationship and it is more 
easily detectable and used (sometimes manipulated) during periods of thawing in what at 
times seem to be a stormy relationship.37
 
In contrast, the President of the autonomous region of Madrid, Esperanza Aguirre, a 
leading Partido Popular figure, very critical of the PSOE’s government, expressed support 
for the dissident movement, in an escalation of criticism made by the PP on the new 
attitude of the Spanish government. This and other disagreements confirmed the end of 
what in the first part of the 90s was considered to be a consensus between the two parties 
regarding the policy to be observed on Cuba. 
 
This Cuba-Spain exchange was enriched by an unprecedented and well publicized visit 
made to Miami by two high-level representatives of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Javier Sandomingo, director of the Ibero-America area, and Pablo Gómez de 
Olea, deputy director, interviewed a wide array of representatives of the Cuban exile 
community and Miami Spanish press for a week. They explained the new EU approach 
led by Spain and shared plans for meetings with the dissident movement in Cuba.38
 
But the Spanish front was not reduced to this high political level. Under a flair of normalcy, 
authorities reported that an increase in the number of Spanish citizens residing in Cuba 
and claiming pensions from the Spanish government,39 while the Spanish consulate in 
Havana recorded between 800 and 1,000 visits to process documents. Of the 30,000 
Spanish citizens living in Cuba, almost 3.000 receive pensions between €1,000 and 
€3,000, a fortune compared with US$15 as basic salary in Cuba and a pension of US$8.40
 
Almost coincidentally, another personality named Eduardo Aguirre arrived in Madrid to 
take the post of US ambassador. Aguirre, a Cuban émigré residing in Houston, an old 
friend of the Bush family, was offered this sensitive position in difficult times when the 
relationship between the Spanish and the US governments was very delicate as a result 
                                                 
34 Gabriela Calotti, ‘Fraga no pidió a Raúl Castro la liberación de presos’, Diario las Américas, 8/V/2005; AFP, 
‘Malestar en el PP por reunión de Fraga con Raúl Castro’, Diario las Américas, 7/V/2005; EFE, ‘Manuel Fraga 
considera un honor la visita de Raúl Castro a Galicia’, Diario las Américas, 7/V/2005. Incidently, Fraga made 
certain pertinent comments to Deutsche-Welle (9/VIII/2006) once the news of Castro’s illness were 
announced, remembering that in 1992 he recommended the Spanish transition as a model for Cuba, not the 
Nicaraguan, as the Cuban leader says in the long and highly controversial interview with Le Monde’s Ignacio 
Ramonet, Fidel Castro: biografía a dos voces (Debate, Madrid, 2006), p. 467-468. 
35 AFP, ‘Ministra vaticina mayor cooperación con Cuba’, Diario las Américas, 24/IV/2005. 
36 This sign of admiration matches the praise given by his brother Fidel in the course of the interview-book by 
Ignacio Ramonet, Fidel Castro: Biografia..., op. cit., p. 460, in which he reiterates his respect for General 
Franco. 
37 Mauricio Vicent, ‘Los Cervera regresan a Cuba’, El País, 27/III/2005; Orlando Guevara Núñez, ‘Preside 
Raúl homenaje a patriotas cubanos y almirante español’, Granma, 26/III/2005. 
38 Gerardo Reyes, ‘España no olvidó a los disidentes, dicen funcionarios’, El Nuevo Herald, 20/III/2005; 
Gustavo Pena, ‘Prepara la UE reuniones con la disidencia en Cuba’, Diario las Américas, 20/III/2005. 
39 EFE, ‘Españoles en Cuba reclaman pensiones’, 10/XI/2005. 
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of the withdrawal of the Spanish military placed in Iraq by Spanish premier Aznar.41 
Although Aguirre has been very prudent not to deal with the Cuba issue, he has been 
relaying the displeasure of the White House for other moves made by the Zapatero 
government in Venezuela. 
 
4. ‘To be Frank, My Dear, I Don’t Give a Damn’ 
 
On the EU side, the lifting of the measures had as a most important result the visit to 
Havana paid by Louis Michel, Commissioner for Development. He met with several 
representatives of the dissident moment in Cuba, with Pérez Roque, minister of foreign 
affairs, and Ricardo Alarcón, president of the Assembly of the Popular Power, the Cuban 
parliament.42 Alarcón has been one of the most critical voices regarding the relationship 
with the EU. On the eve of Pérez Roque’s trip to Europe and right after Michel’s visit to 
Havana, Alarcón demanded of the EU ‘a little humility’ in its relation with Cuba when 
pondering conditions for a better treatment. He labeled the suspended sanctions as 
‘childish’ and considered ‘unimportant’ the promised help from the EU, while warning 
Europe of not treating Cuba as an ‘unbecoming kid, suffering a punishment in a corner by 
a teacher without authority’.43 Days after, Alarcón warned that ‘Cuba would not give power 
to idiots’, referring to the representatives of the dissident movement staging pacific 
demonstrations and meeting with EU officials.44
 
Oddly enough and not by coincidence, this visit was preceded by a special representation 
of the European Parliament. Miguel Angel Martínez, a Spanish radical member of the 
socialist group, led a group (‘Of Friendship and Solidarity’) of the EP members in support 
of Cuba. This group acted to counter the actions taken by the conservative majority led by 
Swedish EP member Cecilia Malstrom, who managed to present an amendment and get 
it approved (376 for, 281 against and 26 abstentions) thanks to the majority of the Popular 
Party-led group of an amendment in the sessions of the Parliament censuring the 
suspension of the EU measures on Cuba. The split of EU institutions on Cuba was then 
obvious. While the Commission was inclined to support the reform and the suspension of 
the measures, as the consensus majority of the EU Council voted, the EP Parliament 
majority expressed dissatisfaction. This is one of the reasons why when Pérez Roque 
visited the Parliament he only met with President Josep Borrell and with the pro-Cuba 
group. While in Havana, the Martínez-led group was received by Vice President Carlos 
Lage.45
 
Since the announcement of the change of EU approach, former Spanish premier José 
María Aznar continued with his criticism on the new Spain’s foreign policy and then 
objected to the audience given by King Juan Carlos to Cuban Foreign Minister Pérez 
Roque, prompting prominent members of the Zapatero government to counter his 
arguments.46 Using one of his periodic lectures at Georgetown University in Washington, 
Aznar branded as a ‘total mistake’ the lifting of the EU sanctions, because it ‘only gives 
strength to the Cuban regime’, with the result that ‘the dissidents are used as 
                                                 
41 EFE, ‘Senado da visto bueno a Eduardo Aguirre’, Diario las Américas, 17/VI/2005. 
42 Elson Concepción, ‘Voluntad para ampliar las relacioines de amistad’, Granma, 26/III/2005; Mauricio 
Vicent, ‘El comisario europeo de desarrollo visita Cuba’, El País, 26/III/2005. 
43 Mar Marín, EFE, ‘Alarcón advierte a la UE que no tiene autoridad para juzgar a Cuba’, Diario las Américas, 
6/III/2005. 
44 AFP, ‘Cuba no entregará el poder a “mentecatos”’, Diario las Américas, 23/III/2005; EFE, ‘Disidencia 
interna pide UE incluya liberaciones en agenda con Cuba’, Diario las Américas, 23/III/2005. 
45 EFE, ‘Parlamento Europeo censura suspensión por la UE de sanciones a Cuba’, Diario las Américas, 
1/IV/2005; Miguel Angel Pedroso, ‘Satisfecha con su visita la delegación del grupo de Amistad y Solidaridad 
del Parlamento Europeo’, 26/III/2005; ‘Eurodiputados socialistas viajan a Cuba para apoyar a Fidel Castro’, 
ABC, 19/III/2005. 
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merchandise’.47 Exhausting the patience of Spanish officials for the frequent criticisms 
made by Aznar on several aspects of Spain’s foreign policy, and most especially the new 
approach to Cuba, Under Secretary of State Bernardino León called Aznar’s attitude 
‘cynic’ and reminded that the former premier himself tried in several occasions to come to 
terms with Castro offering a close relationship.48
 
The overall Cuban scenario and the moves by outside actors also show two events with 
important impact. One was the annual round of the meeting of the Human Rights 
Committee of the United Nations in Geneva. The other was a novelty: the preparations of 
the unprecedented assembly organized by the dissident movement. 
 
Much to the regret of the Cuban government that had invested considerable energy in 
special operations (among them the trip made by Pérez Roque to Europe) in the weeks 
before to obtain a favorable outcome, the UN Commission voted once again a Resolution 
(this time tabled by the United States) on the human rights situation in Cuba. 21 members 
(among all the EU members) voted against Cuba, 17 against the measure, while 15 
abstained. Keen observers had predicted the outcome of the EU attitude based on the 
previous record. In 2004 all EU members sided with the Honduras led-measure; in 2003 
Europe sided with the initiative taken by Costa Rica; and in 2002 the EU members added 
their vote to the Revolution presented by Uruguay.49 When the outcome was known, 
Castro vented his anger at the UN Commission, using one novel expression in his long of 
epithets. This time was the equivalent of ‘I don’t give a damn’. He said: ‘me importa un 
bledo la Comisión’, branding this time the EU members as ‘accomplices’ of the United 
States. 
 
A new trend in the activities of the opposition, a meeting of the ‘Assembly to Protect Civil 
Society’, composed of representatives of the dissidents, was planned and held on May 
20, the day of Cuban independence, under the coordination of Martha Beatriz Roque. As 
expected, the Cuban government placed obstacles for the attendance of outside actors 
and representatives of European organizations, and confirmed attendees were not given 
visas or were stopped at the Havana airport. Among the resident diplomats who attended 
the proceedings was James Cason, chief of the US mission in Havana. However, the 
event was marred by internal disagreements among the different groups, among them the 
organization led by Olwaldo Payá, main author of the Proyecto Varela. The assembled 
members received warm congratulations messages from European politicians, among 
them the leadership of the Spanish Socialist Party.50
 
Among the benefits received by the dissident community was the liberation of poet and 
journalist Raúl Rivero, thanks to the active negotiations of the Spanish government. After 
deciding to reside in Spain, upon his arrival Rivero was received by Spanish premier 
                                                 
47 EFE, ‘Aznar: levantamiento de sanciones a Cuba es “completa equivocación”’, Diario las Américas, 20/IV/ 
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49 A.Z., ‘Cuba echa la red’, Cambio16, 28/III/2005; AFP, ‘Cuba espera que ningún “Caín” latinoamericano 
apoye a EEUU en Ginebra’, Diario las Américas, 8/III/2005; AFP, ‘UE apoya a EEUU que se condene a Cuba 
en Ginebra’, Diario las Américas, 12/IV/2005; EFE, ‘me importra un bledo Comisión de Derechos Humano’, 
9/IV/2005; EFE, ‘Apoyo europeo a condena a Cuba en Ginebra’, Diario las Américas, 13/IV/2005; EFE, 
‘Vuelven a condenar a Cuba en la ONU’, Diario las Américas, 15/IV/2005; Ariel Remos, ‘Sonada derrota de 
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Zapatero, under the auspices of PSOE international relations secretary Trinidad Jiménez 
(who later in the year would become the target of Castro’s wrath).51 Significantly, the PP 
leadership of Madrid gave him the award ‘Tolerance’ awarded the previous December.52 
Although an isolated incident, Rivero was detained for hours when he arrived at the Miami 
airport to participate as a lecturer at the Miami-Dade Community College, much to the 
embarrassment of the exile community leadership.53
 
Economic relations between European countries and Cuba were in the background of this 
evolution, and most especially the Spanish investments. At the end of 2004, the Cuban 
and Spanish governments agreed to close an agreement on the exchange of the debt for 
funds destined to education projects.54 Oil conglomerate Repsol-YPF was exploring 
partnerships with Chinese and Norwegians companies.55  Meanwhile, a reduction of 
business for small and median volume companies was predicted in the background of 
priority given to large multinational companies56 and the aggressive strategy posed by 
China.57 The Cuban government did not renew a dozen licences for small Spanish 
companies, while negotiations for unblocking the trade relations remained frozen.58
 
Oddly in preparation for the reconsideration of the EU approach, the Cuban government 
expelled three members of the parliaments of Spain, Germany and the Czech Republic, 
who had arrived in Havana to attend a gathering of the Assembly for the Civil Society, 
organized by dissident leader Martha Beatriz Roque. Four European journalists trying to 
cover the event were also detained, prompting the EU official protest, causing internal 
friction in Spain with the PP claiming lack of protection given by the Spanish diplomatic 
representation in Cuba.59
 
5. Don’t Blame Me for Trying 
 
In spite of all this conflictive and shaky scenario, as mentioned above, the EU Council 
decided on 13 June 2005, to continue with the suspension of the measures, giving the 
constructive dialogue policy a chance. This time, the EU even walked the extra mile in 
extending the term of the cyclic evaluation of the conditions of the 1996 Common 
Position, from a short six-month period to a whole year, offering Cuba the opportunity to 
show an improvement in its human rights record on June of 2006. 
 
Previous to the announcement of the decisions, all sides with a stake in the issue lobbied 
the EU to either make a change in its policy or stay course. Over a hundred NGOs and 
cooperation agencies demanded the permanent lifting of the 2003 measures, the 
elimination of the Common Position, and the reestablishment of relations between the EU 
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and Cuba based on mutual respect.60 In contrast, a representation of the most important 
dissident organizations in Cuba demanded the EU’s official recognition of the movement, 
stopping the issuing of trade loans to the Cuban regime, and the monitoring of the human 
rights situation, with the explicit recommendation of continuing with the sanctions imposed 
in 2003.61 However, as many insiders62 and independent observers predicted, the EU 
General Affairs Council decided to maintain the status quo taken in January of 2005. 
 
Nonetheless, the text agreed cannot be taken as a triumph for the Cuban regime because 
it was laden with several samples of unusual harsh language. As mentioned aaerlier in 
this paper, while reaffirming the validity of the Common Position and reiterating its 
willingness to maintain a constructive dialogue, the EU insisted on ‘its urgent request to 
Cuba to release unconditionally all political prisoners’, and ‘expressed regret at the lack of 
any further advance since the release in June and November of 2004 of a number of the 
political prisoners’, and ‘condemned the action taken by the Cuban authorities to curb the 
freedom of expression and assembly and freedom of the press’. It also ‘condemned 
Cuba’s unacceptable attitude towards foreign parliamentarians and journalists who 
attended the Assembly (of 20 May 2005)’ and called on the Cuban authorities to refrain in 
the future from such actions which would jeopardize normal relations between Cuba and 
the European Union’. Finally, while noticing that ‘there was no satisfactory progress on 
human rights’, the EU decided to reconsider its Common Position in June 2006, while 
‘measures taken on June 5, 2003, remain suspended’.63
 
Repercussion in the media was wide and deep, creating a climate of further expectation, 
considering the hope expressed by different sectors for a change or reformatting of the 
existing policy.64 The dissident community and representatives of the Cuban exiles 
expressed split opinions, showing satisfaction and displeasure (a majority).65 As expected, 
the US government had issued earlier statements of disagreement with the continuation 
of the EU approach, backed by Spain.66 Following the new trend on the European front, 
along with the business returning to normalcy, was the visit to Havana by Portuguese 
Nobel Prize winner José Saramago, who in 2003 had added his name to the long list of 
protestors for the summary executions and imprisonment of dissidents, expressing 
disgust, drawing a line in his long support for the Cuban regime (‘hasta aquí he llegado’, 
he titled an article of protest then).67
 
Inside the EU machinery and deep in the bowels of the Cuban governmental structure, 
there was a common sentiment that was to dominate the moves of each side in the 
coming months. According to seasoned observers and insiders in Brussels, each side had 
come to the conclusion: the arsenal of arguments available to influence each other was 
exhausted. The stalemate, in essence, neither benefited nor damaged their corresponding 
image, prestige, or appearance of power and resistance. The EU did show until then 
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enough evidence that it tried at all cost to maintain the communications lines open. The 
Cuban regime could proudly say that it had resisted all kinds of pressure and conditions. 
Both came to the final conclusion they can neither influence the other side the way they 
had expected, nor can the other side do them any harm that they could prevent. At the 
end, they stopped communicating, at least on the subject that was central, and still is, so 
far. It is not that both were happy, but that this is the most they could attain. The EU gave 
the Cubans one year of trust, which was in spirit rejected by Havana. 
 
No one was then surprised to see that, from mid 2005 to mid 2006, everything seemed to 
be a sort of business as usual, more of the same. It is also not surprising, then, that while 
some non EU-Cuba scenarios shown repetitious profiles of past experiences, and some 
others were fast approaching to fill the vacuum. It was obvious that the world horizons for 
Cuba were not reduced to the alternatives between Washington and Brussels. While 
traditional alliances were still courted by Castro, the eyes of Havana turned towards the 
Americas not fully dominated by the United States. New circumstances provided Castro 
with a much wider alternative of insertion than the limited scenario offered by the EU in 
the Caribbean branch of the ACP structure. While the United States and Europe insisted 
in the old corresponding script of harassment and constructive engagement, the new 
Bolivarian ‘revolution’ staged by Chávez in Venezuela gave the Cuban regime a much-
needed respite.68
 
6. Other Actors and Settings 
 
The two-year period between the beginnings of the announcement of the first attempts to 
reformat the EU position to Cuba has revealed the active performance of several Czech 
officials and former dignitaries of high profile. It can be safely said that the EU attitude is 
roughly divided between a group of nations actively advocating for the constructive 
engagement policy, another that expresses a prudent and more conditioned approach, 
and the Czech Republic. It is not an insignificant factor to note that it was precisely the 
former Czechoslovak Republic (then including the current Slovakia) that represented the 
Cuban interests in Washington. It seems that any scenario and setting is valid for what 
appears to be a constant, untiring policy. 
 
The record includes a full conference held in Prague, under the aegis of the International 
Committee for Democracy in Cuba (CIDC), presided by former president Vaclav Havel, 
attended by an impressive array of former presidents of mostly Christian Democratic 
affiliation, and former prime ministers of European countries, such as Spain’s José María 
Aznar (one of the main backers), Luis Alberto Lacalle of Uruguay, Luis Alberto Monge of 
Costa Rica, Patricio Aylwin of Chile, Kim Campbell of Canada, and former Secretaries of 
State of the United States Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Madeleine Albright.69 While most of the 
dissident organizations expressed support for the Prague meeting, some issued 
statements of scepticism. 
 
Subsequent incidents between the two countries have included a constant campaign by 
the Czech embassy in Washington, with high profile Ambassador Paulus frequently 
attending as sole diplomat White House or State Department functions announcing new 
measures against Cuba, seminar, lectures, and press briefings held in Miami in contrast 
with the customary usual diplomatic pattern that normally avoids dealing with the business 
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of third countries.70 The notorious string of incidents on both sides of the Atlantic included 
alleged threats made against the Foreign Minister for his criticism against Castro,71 the 
expulsion of the first secretary of the Czech embassy in Havana for alleged spy 
activities,72 the cancellation by the Cuban govern of a reception in a Havana hotel 
organized by the Czech embassy in its national day in retaliation for issuing invitations to 
dissidents.73 This scenario was set in the background of the frequent columns and 
collective declarations signed by Vaclav Havel, published world wide in dozens of 
newspapers.74 As a rule, Prague has issued frequent public declarations, before and after 
the meetings of the EU Council, pressuring the European members for a revision of the 
consensus in the policy towards Cuba, filtering details of the negotiations to the press, 
and making the work of the EU body very difficult, much to the displeasure of the inside 
staff and representatives of the governments.75
 
The life of the dissident movement did not seem to improve in the second semester of 
2005 under the British presidency of the EU. In spite of the fact that France led a motion 
in the direction of the Cuban government by inviting officials to the high profile reception of 
14 July,76 the Castro government unleashed a new wave of harassment (executed by 
‘turbas’) against the opposition around the anniversary of the revolution on 26 July.77 The 
British EU presidency issued a declaration of concern, demanding the release of the new 
imprisoned dissidents.78 Although about 30 dissidents were detained, 18 were released 
shortly.79 The president of the Popular Party in the European Parliament judged the new 
EU policy as an error.80 Dissident leader Oswaldo Payá denounced that the government 
had started ‘a campaign of repression’ against him and his movement that included 
interrogation visits to signatories of his Proyecto Varela.81 Subsequently, government-
sponsored groups placed obstacles for a meeting of representatives of the dissidents in 
the EU delegation in Havana, an incident that was interpreted by Brussels as a direct 
disdainful message to the efforts of keeping the communications lines open with both the 
government and the dissident sectors.82
 
Within this timeframe, exile scholar Rafael Rojas wondered why the Cuban regime still 
enjoyed so much support in Latin America. His conclusion was that the Cuban myth 
persisted because it feeds with nostalgia on the resistance against the United States in an 
increasingly unipolar world. Castro insisted on presenting himself ‘as a Latin American 
David, confronting an Anglo-Saxon egotistical Goliath, in other words as moral nemesis of 
the United States. He knows that the small authority left for Havana is only a gift from his 
most intransigent enemies’.83 It was not a simple coincidence that on 28 July, the State 
Department made the announcement of the appointment of Caleb McCarry as 
‘Coordinator of the Cuban Transition’, a position to be inserted in the structure created by 
the Commission for the Assistance to a Free Cuba’, set in 2004 with the purpose of 
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coordinating the efforts of several US agencies in providing support to a new government 
in Cuba at the moment of the political transition.84 Secretary Rice and McCarry publicly 
and singly recognized the presence of Czech Ambassador Paulus as sole diplomat in 
attendance.85
 
This assistance is supposed to be conditioned to the implementation of a set of measures 
and criteria according to the lines of liberal democracy and a market economy. The 
essence and the letter of the conditions are not different than the ones included in Title II 
of the Helms-Burton act. Significantly, McCarry was at the time of the congressional 
approval of the law an assistant of Roger Noriega, chief of the office of Senator Helms. It 
is a significant detail that Title II (never suspended, even temporarily as Title III is every 
semester by authority of the President) contemplated the implementation of a coordinator 
figure very similar to the one bestowed on McCarry. Among the new measures taken by 
the US government in this setting was the drastic restriction on travel from the United 
States to Cuba, adding to the perennial resistance of the Cuban government for its 
citizens to freely emigrate. Human rights organizations and international observers heavily 
criticized this US move.86 As this essay will later show, the Commission issued an update 
report in mid 2006.87
 
Although the relationship has been long, during this same term frequent news about a 
reinforced partnership between Cuba and Venezuela began to worry the US government. 
This trend coincided with an increase in complications in the Middle East once the 
celebrations of Bush’s reelection were over. As developments later would show with the 
membership of Venezuela in Mercosur after leaving the Andean Community, Cuba 
elected a much wider theatre of operations than the limited scenario of the Caribbean. 
Castro and Chávez embarked in an ambitious operation of swapping their much precious 
human and material resources. While the Cuban leader provided free social, educational, 
and medical assistance, Venezuela backed the Cuban economy with oil.88
 
It is not surprising then, as a confirmation of the new low priority given by Castro to the 
European scene, that he finally elected not to attend the Ibero-American summit held in 
the Spanish city of Salamanca, in spite of the lobbying made by the Spanish government 
to obtain a record participation. Although the exile community made preparations for 
protests, Castro decided to follow the pattern of remaining absent since the summit held 
in Panamá in 2000. He gave as an excuse that he had to concentrate in the efforts of 
delivering Cuban help to Central America and Pakistan in times of natural disasters.89 
Although threats of an attempt against his life were mentioned as a justification and the 
fact that a potential court order could place him arrested as Pinochet in London, the more 
plausible explanation was that the occasion did not merit his efforts. He preferred instead 
to concentrate his energies in selected travels where he would obtain the reward of 
unquestioned stardom, not subject to hidden conditions in order not to embarrass his 
hosts, among them King Juan Carlos and the new prime minister of Spain.90 Nonetheless 
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the gathering could be considered a positive milestone for the Cuban government not only 
by the fact that no critical remarks were made on the human rights situation and no 
demands or recommendations were given to Foreign Minister Pérez Roque, substituting 
for Castro, but by virtue of a significant linguistic detail used in the official documentary 
declarations. For the first time in the history of the Ibero-American submits, the word 
‘bloqueo’ (‘blockade’) was used in substitution of the milder term ‘embargo’ as it is 
customarily used also in governmental Spanish. ‘Bloqueo’ is normally only employed by 
parties, groups and commentators much inclined to give unconditional support to the 
Cuban regime. Caught in the media dispute and the concerns expressed by the US 
administration, the Spanish government and the Ibero-American submit staff stated that 
the term is regularly used in Spanish in the documents issued by the United Nations.91
 
The ‘canapé war’ (as the confrontation over the polemic invitation of dissidents to national 
celebrations in European embassies in Havana is called) was renewed during the month 
of October as the new EU approach was interpreted in different ways by each one of the 
governments, now more free to choose an alternative way for maintaining links with the 
opposition. This policy was under the scrutiny of numerous observers not only in different 
European countries but also in the Americas.92 On the one hand, the German embassy 
elected to have not one reception, but two, one in the morning for the diplomatic corps 
and a second in the afternoon to receive members of the ‘civil society’. But the Cuban 
government did no like this compromise and boycotted attending the diplomatic gathering. 
As referred above, at the end of the month, the Cuban government suspended the 
celebration of the Czech national day in a Spanish Sol Meliá hotel in Havana, an incident 
that prompted the protest of the dissident movement against the hotel chain, accusing the 
Spanish business of ‘confabulation’ with the Cuban government.93
 
On the other hand, the Spanish embassy implemented the new policy. It consisted not 
inviting the dissidents, but also organizing periodic meetings with them, an approach that 
apparently received the nodding of the Cuban authorities. Nonetheless, Castro increased 
his periodic declarations of protest against not only the United States, but also against any 
efforts of the European countries and the EU to impose conditions on assistance. 
Simultaneously, the Czech and Slovak governments reiterated their intentions of 
coordinating efforts in convincing the rest of the EU to reinstate the measures taken in 
2003.94
 
However, from mild diplomatic flaps, the confrontation between Cuba’s apparent most 
important link in Europe and the Castro government picked up as the year was closing. 
The new occasion was the expulsion of two members of the Spanish Association for a 
Cuba in Transition (AECT), who had been in the country compiling information for a 
report.95 His material, including video recording of declarations of the organization Ladies 
in White (families of political prisoners) demanding the support of the EU Parliament that 
had awarded them a prize for their activity.96 The Spanish government protested the 
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expulsion measure, almost just after Fidel Castro used one of his speeches to harshly 
criticized the comments made by the international relations director of the PSOE, Trinidad 
Jiménez, who had earlier demanded the termination of the harassment of the Cuban 
opposition.97 Jiménez, who earlier in the year was instrumental in the process for the 
release and ultimate residence of dissident poet Raúl Rivero in Spain, was this time 
branded by Castro as ‘a functionary of a party that calls itself Socialist or Social 
Democratic’, a rather unusual and disdainful way to refer to the party led in the past by 
Felipe González and now by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, and considered by the 
Spanish opposition of the PP as friendly to the Cuban regime. It must also be noted that 
the Ladies in White organization delivered a letter to the British embassy (as EU 
presidency) asking for the release of political prisoners, while holding press conferences 
in front of the Spanish embassy.98
 
In this context, it needs to be noted that some protagonists of the dissident movement are 
more favored than others. For example, former Spanish premier José María Aznar and 
the Popular Party have shown an inclination for Oswaldo Payá, whose group is backed by 
Christian Democratic interests.99 Other political formations in Spain and Europe support, 
morally or with indirect funding, Social Democratic dissidents, such as the group led by 
Manuel Cuesta Morúa, and individuals that in an open society could then develop middle 
of the way Liberal parties. That wide spread of political views generates contrasts 
between the consensus that the EU Council has to craft when issuing a declaration and 
the mathematical vote counting that the EU Parliament uses in commissions and in 
plenary sessions, where the majority of Christian Democratic and conservative members 
manage to incline the decisions towards a more critical view. Faithful to his backers when 
he was running for office, Aznar has maintained his support for the CANF. When the crisis 
of Castro’s illness exploded, Aznar pledged his support and the resources of his FAES 
foundation for the efforts of the organization.100
 
In a series of roundtables held in Brussels on 8 November 2005, in what appeared to be a 
compact recording of the different attitudes of the several sectors from different countries 
that had a saying on the evolution of the Cuban regime and the measures applied to 
influence, persuade, or coerce it, several representatives of the EU institutions and 
European governments issued unusual statements rarely ventured in public. Among US 
government and scholars, and a handful of European observers and researches, Karl 
Buck, a pivotal staff member of the EU Council and head of its Latin American unit, 
responded to the usual criticism that the European front was divided regarding the policy 
to be applied to Cuba by pointing out that the US sector was equally divided, with interest 
in food exporting states opposed to the US embargo strategy. Javier Sandomingo (who 
years ago was the acting Spain’s ambassador for three years when Castro rescinded the 
placet to the newly-named envoy Josep Coderch), now director of the Latin American 
division in the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, deflected the accusation that Spain only 
acted by economic interests in espousing the new policy of ‘constructive engagement’. He 
pointed out that Spain was surpassed by Canada in investments, and by the United 
Kingdom and Italy in tourism, while in trade Spain is behind Venezuela… and even the 
United States.101 He admitted that it is very difficult for the EU to maintain a real Common 
Position, because that does not exclude that each of the Member States have its own 
                                                                                                                                                   
11/XII/2005; EFE, ‘Malestar por expulsión de dos españoles’, El Nuevo Herald, 11/XI/2005. 
97 EFE, ‘Madrid protesta por expulsión de dos españoles de Cuba’, Diario las Américas, 12/XII/2005; EFE, 
‘Castro arremete de nuevo contra Europa y EEUU’, Diario las Américas, 8/XII/2005. 
98 EFE, ‘Esposa de disidente preso apela a Europa’, El Nuevo Herald, 20/XII/2005. 
99 See also, for example, the support given by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former Czech 
President Vaclav Havel. ‘The Cuba’s people must be heard’, The Miami Herald, 13/VIII/2006. 
100 El País, ‘Aznar ofrece su apoyo a la oposición en el exilio’, 6/VIII/2006. 
 18
101 In reality, in global figures covering the period 2005-06, trade financing records show Venezuela well 
ahead with US$2.05 billion, followed by China with US$1.1 billion, and France and the Netherlands also 
surpassing Spain. 
Area: Latin America – WP 16/2006 
August 2006 
policy, including countries such as Spain with a long history of intimate relations with 
Cuba and others that barely can place this country on the map. Rejecting the notion that 
Spain gave the Cuban regime legitimacy, while admitting that the open communication 
policy has obtained the expected results, the economic reforms promoted by Spain in the 
early 90s resulted in an improvement of the livelihood of ample sectors of the Cuban 
population, an aspect that only time will show if in the future would be accepted as 
positive for the transition. Tomás Duplá, director of the Latin American area in the 
Commission, in a rare public statement for a non-political staff member, admitted that the 
EU and the United States share common features regarding their corresponding policies 
towards, among them the promotion of economic recovery and the support of civil society 
and the opposition, but the tactics employed do not coincide. While European investments 
aim to construct a more open system, the US extraterritorial laws tend to close it. While 
the dialogue with the Cuban government is part of the equation, it is not an end in itself. 
For different reasons, Cuba has become a domestic issue in both continents and this 
factor has contributed to the difficulties to find a common ground.102
 
7. A New Stormy Season 
 
The year 2006 responded to the expectations with the battle lines well drawn between the 
Cuban government and the outside actors, each one well assured and resigned that the 
most important factor in a considerable change of the profile and behavior of the Cuban 
regime would only come within the framework of the political transition. While for some 
this goal was aimed to be within the reaching range, considering the age of Castro (to be 
80 in August), for others the calendar was not to be central issue, but the appropriate 
record of measures to be taken. Nonetheless, all actors had their agendas well set in 
anticipation and hidden cards were difficult to be thrown on the table. That is the main 
explanation for what appeared to be a de-escalation of the diplomacy behavior that had 
central stage in a portion of the previous years. Assured that its priorities were going to be 
placed in other regions where play it cards, the Cuban government did not lose any 
opportunity to actively question any move of the EU, and most specially Spain, that was 
not in line with the potential benefit for the Castro regime. 
 
For example, when the President of the Autonomous Community of Madrid, Esperanza 
Aguirre, visited Miami on a trade promotion mission, and vowed ‘support for a future 
democratic Cuba,’, Granma accused her of financing the Cuban American National 
Foundation and its branch in Madrid, where Cuban Ambassador Velazco denounced her 
for meeting with ‘torturers of Batista’. When US Senator Mel Martínez visited Madrid and 
was received by Spain’s heir Prince Felipe, Velazco called Martínez ‘a representative of 
the Miami terrorists’. Consequently, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a 
protest.103 Concurrently, a representation of the Cuban National Foundation was invited to 
participate in a seminar organized by the Jaime Vera Foundation of the PSOE in 
Madrid.104
 
Press reports revealed what it was already a well known trend by the keen observers of 
the Spanish-Cuban contradictory scene: many children and close family (called 
‘quedaditos’) of current and former high level Cuban officials have been residing in Spain 
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with a status that ranges from exile to temporary residence and full time jobs.105 The roll 
call is really impressive and includes the children of two commanders of the Cuban 
Revolution (Ramiro Valdés and Juan Almeyda), an uncle of US congressmen Lincoln and 
Mario Díaz-Balart, and the son of Havana’s historian Eusebio Leal, leader of the tourism 
and preservation projects. It is estimated that there are more than 200,000 Cubans living 
in Spain, of which 60,000 have Spanish citizenship, making them the largest Cuban 
population outside of Cuba with the exception of the United States, where close to one 
million Cubans live. 
 
In expectation of the forthcoming IV Summit of the EU-Latin America-Caribbean to be 
held in Vienna and the revision of the Common Position due in June, the Spanish 
government received expected pressures from the domestic opposition.106 However, in 
spite of the reported difficulties suffered by small Spanish enterprises in Cuba, a group of 
companies were preparing contracts worth €180 million.107
 
The patience of the EU Parliament with Cuba ended and the customary division between 
the Socialist group and the Conservative-Christian Democratic-led majority did not 
function in view of the slow progress made by the Castro government in matters of human 
rights. By an unprecedented overwhelming majority of 560 votes for, and only 33 against 
and 19 abstentions, on 2 February 2006, the EU body ‘condemned the strengthening of 
repression, the increase of the number of political prisoners (from 294 in 2004 to 333) and 
the prohibition for the Ladies in White to come to Strasburg to receive the Sajarov Prize’. 
The EU Parliament wondered about the success of the lifting of the measures in 2005.108
 
In the apparently dormant front of the Torricelli and the Helm-Burton legislation, a grave 
incident erupted in Mexico when the US government ordered the Sheraton Hotel in 
Mexico City to evict 16 Cuban representatives who were in town to meet with US oilmen, 
in a rare application of the embargo legislation that prohibits trade and deals with Cuba. 
The Mexican government then retaliated by ordering the closure of the hotel.109 This world 
famous US legislation has only its Title III suspended every six months regarding the 
potential execution of a clause by which US citizens could sue foreign companies making 
deals with former summarily expropriated US properties. Subsequently, the US and the 
EU authorities designed in 1998 an agreement of ‘understanding’ freezing the possibility 
of actions against European companies. However, Latin American and Canadian 
businesses are not free of this threat, because it only applies to EU-US controversies. 
 
On the strictly US-Cuba front, the escalation of the mostly verbal and juridical mutual 
harassment seemed to show some interesting angles, although they have been within the 
historical parameters. In the fringes of the US territory, the US and Cuba came to a draw 
with a significant different outcome in the academic and sports terrains. While the US 
government had to bow to international pressure and allow the Cuban baseball team to 
participate in the World Cup in Puerto Rico and California, the State Department denied 
once more the necessary visas for over 70 Cuban academics to attend the Latin 
American Studies Association (LASA) convention held in San Juan, partially under the 
justification that the paper presenters are in fact government employees. Observers 
pointed out that the banning of the baseball team could render the expulsion of the United 
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States from world sport organizations, while the academic sector does not enjoy a similar 
political and financial clout.110 As a consolation for defenders of academic freedom, LASA 
voted in an unprecedented move (with considerable economic cost) to move the 
September 2007 from Boston to Montreal, Canada, where the Cubans could attend 
without the requirements of US visas. 
 
8. The Evolution and Transfiguration of the Embargo Legislation 
 
All the global strategy of the US government towards Cuba received a new and 
invigorated shape with the presentation of the new Report drafted by the Commission for 
Assistance to a Free Cuba. The result of the work of more than one hundred officials in 17 
different agencies, the new document of only 90 pages refines the arguments of the 
previous voluminous 2004 report of over 400 pages, claimed a budget of US$80 million 
destined to ‘support civil society, ‘academic exchanges, ‘projects to break the Castro 
government information blockade’, broadcasting operations (Radio and TV Martí), and aid 
to the opposition.111 While the Coordinator of the Commission Caleb McCarry praised the 
report and representatives of the Cuban exile community lauded its release,112 the Cuban 
government unleashed its wrath with a new round of harsh epithets against the US 
policy,113 and the opposition showed new signs of split regarding the measures and scope 
of the new policy, with the hardest criticism coming from prominent members of the 
dissident movement pointing out that the content of the report would only benefit Fidel 
Castro.114
 
The document enjoyed a sudden thrust in the media limelight when the alarming news of 
the illness and temporary withdrawal of Fidel Castro were announced. The initial scant 
statements coming from Washington focused on the report. Under the co-authorship of 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her colleague in Commerce, Cuban-American 
Carlos Gutiérrez, is simply a series of recommendations for President Bush in support of 
Cuba’s transition to democracy. It looks like an honest offer for a future government, but 
while the present dictatorship is in place, the invitation is void. 
 
The sudden stardom of the document in the context of Castro’s temporary trouble 
confirmed a subtle tactic of the White House and the Department of State to upgrade the 
status of this declaration of intentions to the level of law. In fact, the report reiterates the 
proposal of the previous, more voluminous, document of 2004, then under the sole 
authorship of Colin Powell. Although the Commission was established a year earlier under 
the co-chair of a Cuban-American member of the Bush cabinet, Mel Martínez, he ceased 
to serve when he became US Senator. However, the new document still had the 
background inspiration of the main advocate of the most important legislation on the US 
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embargo, Cuban-American Senator from New Jersey, Bob Menéndez.115 Filled by 
technical details, but laden with political content, the report was to be interpreted as one of 
the Washington mistakes that led to the approval of the Helms-Burton act, universally 
received with irritation and lament. The result was that Helms-Burton has been in 
mothballs since then. 
 
An exploration of the web of the Commission (www.cafc.gov) in the digital space of the 
State Department strangely reveals that Helms-Burton is not mentioned at all as part of 
the legislation on the US embargo (www.cafc.gov/leg/). In contrast, it explicitly includes 
the Cuban Adjustment Act and the Cuban democracy Act of 1992 (better known as the 
‘Torricelli’ law). This absence is significant, since H-B is the codification of the historical 
embargo, when it transformed what was subject to the free will of the President since the 
60s to federal law in 1996. 
 
This neutralization would seem as a gesture to the EU, reaffirming the understanding of 
1998 to freeze the threat against investments in Cuba. But the true reason may be to hide 
the darker aspects of its Title II. In contrast with III, addressed to foreign investors daring 
to ‘traffic’ with expropriated properties, II was designed for a future Cuban government to 
be dutifully certified in good transition to democracy. It demands the return of all 
confiscated properties to their original owners, in a plan that is economically and socially 
unfeasible for any government. But, as a federal law, it is still in place and guarantees the 
continuation of the embargo. Ironically, designed as a shackle for President Clinton, of 
dubious loyalty to Cuban exile causes, it now hovers over Bush’s head in uncertain times. 
In order to supersede it with different measures and decisions on the embargo, it has to 
be officially and procedurally repealed. 
 
A careful reading of Title II is a revealing lesson, in contrast with the language used in the 
new report. In its origin, Title II was a separate bill sponsored by then New Jersey 
congressman Bob Menéndez. Its original name significantly was ‘Support for a Free and 
Democratic Cuba’. Failing to pass the corresponding committee of the House, its was 
transfigured as the second part of the final Helms-Burton approved in 1996 in the 
aftermath of the shot down of the Brothers to the Rescue places. A listing of conditions on 
a democratic Cuba it was added to a threat (Title III and IV) against foreign investors. 
Economic compensation and financial restitution were then backed by altruistic 
democracy-seeking aims.  
 
The parallel reading of Title II and the recommendations of the report show that the direct 
and harsh language of H-B has been softened considerably. Title II prescribes that, in 
order to accept a Cuban government in good standing to enjoy the lifting of the embargo, 
it demands that the new government is ‘taking appropriate steps to return to United States 
citizens property taken by the Cuban Government from such citizens and entities on or 
after 1 January 1959, or to provide equitable compensation to such citizens and entities 
for such property’. 
 
In the preface of the first report, Colin Powell outlined the conditions for an acceptable 
government: legalize all political activity, free political prisoners, call for free elections, and 
the banning of Fidel and Raúl Castro. There is not a single word on the property issue, a 
delicate item that reappears later inside the text. The new report advises at the end ‘to 
reassure the Cuban people that the US Government will not support any arbitrary effort to 
evict them from their homes’. Then it warns that ‘action on confiscated property is best 
postponed until a fully legitimate democratic government is elected’. In other words, it 
reverses the order of priority given in Title II of H-B where the condition of restitution is 
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placed before the new government is recognized as democratic and worthy of the lifting of 
the US embargo.116
 
However, just in case, facing the prospects of a renewed effort by the US Congress sector 
that has been pressing to end the embargo, a further plan to re-codify the 
recommendation enshrined in the reports of the Commission took the shape of the so-
called Cuba Transition Act. Introduced by Senator John Ensign (R-NV) and co-sponsored 
by Senator Mel Martínez and others, failed to be considered by Congress before 
adjourning for the August recess.117 Senator Martínez held a press conference as soon as 
Castro’s illness was announced in which he stated that Helms-Burton ‘does not speak as 
to aperson, but speaks as to an attitude of the Cuban government’. He added that once 
‘the Cuban government begins the process of transitioning… the conditions are also in 
Helms-Burton to begin a process for us to reciprocate in kind’. Close readers of Helms-
Burton would detect a contradiction in this statement, because the text explicitly prohibits 
the presence of Fidel or Raúl Castro in any future Cuban government. Martínez further 
ventured that the United States ‘should not feel constrainted by Helms-Burton, which is 
now a decale-old piece of legislation… we could act at any moment to enact new 
legislation’.118 Similar contradiction could be detected when Assistant Secretary of State 
Thom Shannon reminded in a press conference held on 23 August the offer made by 
President Bush to lift the embargo: ‘free political prisoners, respect human rights -- 
especially those rights most important for the effective exercise of democracy -- … permit 
the creation of independent organizations such as political parties, trade unions, civic 
associations that were dominated by the state,…. to create a mechanism and a pathway 
towards elections’. Having met these conditions, ‘we would look in consultation with our 
Congress for ways to lift the embargo and begin a deeper engagement with the Cuban 
state.’119 In other words, the United States could consider lifting the embargo without 
Cuban meeting one of the key conditions of Title II of Helms-Burton, that any future 
government in transition should not include either Fidel or Raúl Castro. 
 
Legal experts may comment that although for a new legislation to be in place, the old one 
does not have to be repealed (only the latest would supersede the old one), it would odd if 
Helms-Burton, as a codification of the embargo, is then contradicted by fragments of a 
new legislation dealing with specific items. In any event, and in spite of all optimistic hope, 
prospects of an energized life of Martínez’s new bill in the fall, close to elections, are slim, 
in addition to the uncertainty created by the Castro’s crisis. Same can be said of 
Shannon’s offer while midterm legislative elections were approaching. These moves only 
dramatize further that the legal maze of the embargo measures are closely linked with not 
only the political aims of different interests, but also with the economic objectives of 
others. 
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In consequence, with Title III frozen, IV simply as a theoretical threat to deny visas, and II 
demoted (Title I is a simple introductory declaration), what is left of the codification of the 
embargo? Seasoned observers and scholars have an answer: nothing. That is why the 
Commission vanished Helms-Burton from the web space. Meanwhile, as soon as the 
news of the Castro’s illness were announced, numerous editorials and columns calling for 
the end of the embargo appeared in newspapers of Europe and the United States, 
authored not only by usual critics in the cradle of the Cuban exile community,120 but by a 
wide spectrum of ideological inclinations that even included, among other US media, The 
Wall Street Journal,121 and internationally, London’s Financial Times.122
 
During the first days of Castro’s crisis, President Bush had a golden opportunity to end the 
embargo and challenge Raúl with an offer he could not refuse. However, after advising 
the Cuban leadership to act fast towards democracy, he warned that the United States 
would take note of whoever placed obstacles on the path to a democratic transition. But 
the message was also dressed with moderation considering the circumstances, inviting 
the Cuban people to work together for a democratic change, words that were echoed by 
Secretary of State Rice. In addition, he later advised the Cuban exiles to put off the 
question of restitution of property until a fully democratic government is in place. The most 
explicit decision made by the US government were clear signs that Washington was 
priming the national interest and the security of the country, keeping the plans of the exile 
community in the backburner. As a confirmation of this cautious and realistic attitude, 
Senator Mel Martínez had an unsual presentation for a gathering of his colleagues in the 
Peter Pan operation, when he advised the representatives of the exiles that came to the 
United States as children escaping from Cuba’s communism in the early 60s, of having 
extreme ‘patience’ in dealing with the stalemate created by Castro’s illness, waiting for a 
clear outcome that may take months.123 Simultaneously, Alfredo Durán, a former 
president of the association of veterans of the Bay of Pigs invasion force, and a leader of 
the moderate centrist sector of the exile community, considered as erroneous a US policy 
of refusing to have a dialogue que Raúl Castro.124
 
As first measure taken after the crisis erupted, the White House announced the 
confirmation of the immigration policy within the legal framework and numbers (about 
21,000 per year), priming family ties, and stressing that illegal migration was not going to 
be tolerated.125 As a collateral message and a threat directed to Venezuela’s Chávez, the 
plan included an expansion of asylum spots reserved for Cuban doctors working as 
volunteers in Latin America. Several sectors of the exile community did not receive well 
this news, labeling the new reformatted strategy as opportunist and an offering of a 
escape valve to Raúl Castro.126 In addition, confidential reports indicated that military 
plans were in place to stop a remake of the Mariel of the 1994 boat migration by shear 
force of the US Navy, while ground forces would occupy some keys off Cuba mainland to 
convert them into transitory detentions. 
 
These signs of prudence were replicated when on Sunday, 13 August, significantly 
Castro’s birthday, the Cuban media printed photographs of him while recovering, along a 
signed message,127 and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez arrived in Havana to spend 
the day. In addition to this, Raúl Castro reappeared in public receiving the Venezuelan 
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president at the airport.128 The highly publicized meeting and gift exchange in Castro’s 
hospital room generated word-wide commentaries and interpretations regarding not only 
his health129 but also the actual role played by his brother Raúl. Significantly, editorials of 
major Spanish newspapers had extreme critical evaluation of what was perceived as a 
‘spectacle’ and a sign that nothing substantial had changed.130 Castro’s temporary 
successor went back into obscurity to reappear again in a interview on the Granma 
newspaper where he combined warnings against foreign intervention, reassurances that 
things were normal in Cuba, and a guarded offer of dialogue to the United States on equal 
footing.131 Speculation increased regarding Raúl’s realistic chances to reinforce his 
temporary power and chances of inheriting the influence enjoyed by his brother for almost 
half a century.132 Meanwhile, the US government announced the creation of a joint job to 
coordinate the intelligence functions for Cuba and Venezuela, with the resulting irritation 
of the Venzuelan regime and a degree of humor emanating from President Chávez.133
 
However, the overall cautionary approach coming from Washington reflected the fear of 
the US government facing a frenzy of retaliation and plans to demand the return of 
expropriated properties. This perception would trigger the expected exploitation by the 
Castro regime of the anxiety of the Cuban people for future eviction of their current 
dwellings. Groups and individuals in the exile community rushed to clarify that there was 
not the intention of the potential returnees to force the current tenants to leave. While 
attorneys advising the US companies that had their business expropriated considered that 
innovative solutions (such as using US aid funds to compensate former owners) could be 
explored, individual former owners expressed intentions to receive either compensation or 
restitution for rural and urban properties, but to the exclusion of residences.134
 
In an unrelated development to the crisis generated by the Castro’s illness, a latent 
pending issue closely linked to the controversy of the expropriations came suddenly to the 
surface when the US patent and trademark office ruled that the Cuban government could 
not claim any rights to the Havana Club rum brand in the United States because its 
registration had expired. In turn, that means that Bacardí, the rum empire that bought the 
US rights from the original Arechabala family, can claim to be entitled to market in the 
United States a made in Puerto Rico Havana Club product, opening for a world wide 
competition with the product made and marketed by a partnership forged by the Cuban 
government and the French company Pernaud Ricard.135
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9. Cuba Snubs the EU, Rediscovers Latin America 
 
Returning to the evolution of the EU-Cuba relationship, as referred above, and in spite of 
the evident lack of progress of the Cuban human rights record, the EU decided on 12 
June 2006, to continue with the parameters of its policy towards Cuba, framed on the 
1996 Common Position (to be reviewed every six months) and the extension of the 
suspension of the June 2003 measures. The new Conclusions, as usual, were not free of 
harsh language against Cuban policies and behavior. The text ‘deplored the further 
deterioration of the human rights situation’, ‘noted that the number of political prisoners 
had risen’ (to more than 330), ‘urged to unconditional release of all political prisoners’, 
pointing out ‘concern’ for ‘several dozen acts of violent harassment and intimidation, and 
‘that the government had rolled back reforms leading to a tentative economic opening’. 
The Council finally announced ‘to start working on a mid-and long-term strategy on 
Cuba’.136 Exile organizations and human rights groups expressed dissatisfaction with the 
continuation of the EU approach.137 The Cuban government blasted the EU with a new 
round of protests for the decision, calling the announcement a sign of ‘pathetic’ alliance 
with the United States, and labeling the EU as a ‘lackey’ of President Bush,138 arguments 
that were already advanced by the Cuban government in the context of the IV Summit of 
European Union. Latin America-Caribbean held in Vienna.139
 
The Cuban government’s assessment of an alleged coalition formed by the EU and 
Washington could in a way be backed by remembering the fact that the US presidents 
Clinton and Bush have been suspending every six months Title III to the point that it 
ceased to be news, and sometimes was hidden in irrelevant pages of newspapers, but 
dutifully reported by the Cuban media.140 On top of that, the US government has been 
basically complying with the agreement made with the EU for not trying to harass 
European businesses that for one reason or another may have deals related to the 
formerly expropriated properties. While from time to time there have been news about 
attempts to deny visas to executives of Spanish companies, and some had legal 
expenses related to threats in that direction, no news have erupted that would signal a 
potential trade war. 
 
In this context, Spanish companies did not seem to be under special pressure. Sol Meliá 
announced that it was establishing a joint venture for a chain of ‘Floridita’ bars in Europe, 
under a system of franchising. The same company has expanded its operations in Cuba. 
While divesting itself of hotels in the Canary Islands, it has invested further in Cuba, 
where 30% of all tourists who visit the country stay in Sol Meliá hotels. Globally, during 
the first quarter of 2006, the chain experienced a gain in profits of 55.6% over the same 
period the year before.141
 
At the same time Cuba has been able to afford to antagonize European interests. It has 
enjoyed the luxury of rejecting development aid, equalizing the demands of conditions 
imposed by Brussels and different European governments with the historical pressure 
applied by the United States. Subsequently, Castro had obviously rediscovered additional 
dimensions in the more ample Latin American continent. Considering the Caribbean as 
too narrow for its operations, Cuba embarked on a strategy that is intimately linked to an 
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unexpected ally –Venezuela.  It also began its infiltration of MERCOSUR, a subregional 
organization that some years ago seemed to have objectives to be too economic and 
capitalist for Castro’s taste. Slowly but tenaciously, Castro has turned to be the most solid 
ally of Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez. In his company, Cuba began to act as a de facto 
member of MERCOSUR, when Venezuela left the Andean Community, and right after 
defecting became an instant member of the Southern Cone regional integration network. 
Attending the trade pact’s gathering in Córdoba, Argentina, Castro signed an Agreement 
of Economic Complementarity (ACE) by which Cuba will be able to purchase some 2,700 
products at advantageous tariffs and prices. Meanwhile, Venezuela, the new star member 
of MERCOSUR, provides 98,000 barrels of oil to Cuba at a price one third below the 
market. In return, Castro lends 30,000 doctors for Chávez’s social programmes. 
 
Although political and economic observers have been scratching their heads regarding 
the feasibility of not only Cuba’s effective linkage with MERCOSUR, but also about the 
outcome of Venezuela’s performance in a group where Brazil is already showing signs of 
uneasiness, the fact is that no one has been to correct the political validity of either 
Chávez’s or Castro’s bold statements. While the Venezuelan strongman has vowed that 
with his country’s entry, a new and different MERCOSUR has been born, Castro ventured 
that Cuba can become a member any time he wishes. In any event, the fact remains that 
Cuba has changed course in prioritizing the scenarios Castro needs to face, once more in 
time, the power of the United States. 
 
Simultaneously, on a terrain that is equally important for Europe and the United States, 
significant developments erupted signaling either a considerable erosion of the embargo 
pressure or precise movements to eliminate it altogether, besides the subtle textual 
maneuvers mentioned above. What are the main reasons for the apparent change of 
world priorities for Cuba in seeking support and new scenarios for its economic and 
political ventures? What could be the subject that links both phenomena –the weakening 
of the embargo and the expanded field of operations for Cuba in Latin America with hands 
tied to Venezuela? The answer is simple: oil. More precisely, it is not only the oil wealth 
enjoyed by Venezuela, but the discovery of important potential reserves in Cuban waters 
very close to the United States. 
 
For the time, the European and Canadian interests seem to have an advantage, a 
situation that is obviously due to the embargo banning. But things may change in the near 
future if the US oil companies apply as much energy in circumventing the US legislation 
as the food producing states have been investing with the result of profiting from this 
loophole that allows certain US companies to sell goods to Cuba under the humanitarian 
exception. The whole story began when Cuba ceased to be a totally barren land in oil 
reserves and production. Since 1971, when with the help of the Soviets, oil reserves were 
discovered off Varadero, Cuba has managed to cover about 40% of its consumption with 
this rather heavy and of poor quality oil, prompting Castro to rely on Venezuela to fill in for 
the vanishing of imports from the defunct Soviet Union. But in 2004, the Spanish-
Argentine conglomerate Repsol-YPF began to make perforation of rich reserves just 
about 20 miles off the Cuban north coast. Subsequently Repsol entered a partnership with 
CUPET (Cuba oil company) and Norwegian HYDRO and India’s ONGC Videsh.142
 
Consequently, US congressmen favoring the hardening of the embargo retaliated by 
presenting legislation and pressure to deny visas to executives of the oil companies, in a 
variation of the application of Title IV of the Helms-Burton legislation, under the 
justification that oil exploration so close to the Florida coast would be environmentally 
damaging. They were faced by equally energetic colleagues in Congress, Rep. Jeff Flake, 
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R-Arizona, and Sen. Larry Craig, R-Idaho, introducing a bill that would exempt oil 
exploration and trade from the embargo. While experts warn that discovery of oil reserves 
does not guarantee its fast refining and marketing, not to speak about its use in Cuba 
itself, the danger for US interests is to be one day totally absent in his new development. 
Meanwhile, Castro is consolidating its intimate link with Venezuela.143
 
The consensus in both sides of the Atlantic regarding the attitude to be taken or already in 
motion with the expected Cuban transition or succession (depending of the corresponding 
political inclinations and realism) includes as part of the common denominator the 
prevalent sentiment of a wait and see tactic. However, all the agreement ends here, 
because for the US government and the hard sector of the Cuban exile community the 
code to be followed is enshrined, as we have seen above, in the report of the transition 
commission or in fragments of the embargo legislation still valid, such as Title II of the 
Helm-Burton act. 
 
With the panorama of mutual attitudes as outlined above, the EU structure and most 
European governments went into the usual slowdown for the summer vacation (only to be 
disturbed considerably by the Lebanon crisis) for studying the drafting of a strategy 
towards Cuba. Although there is the possibility of a hardening of the conditions imposed, 
in case that the Castro government would like to enjoy an extension of the ‘constructive 
dialogue’ offered, the reasonable and cautionary approach is the maintaneance of the 
existing scope and language. 
 
10. The Eclipse of the Patriarch 
 
In this context, the 31 July stunning news of Castro’s illness and temporary retirement 
from power hit the EU dormant institutions preparing for the summer break and most 
influential governments on the Cuban issues with surprise. In contrast with the vocal 
reactions generated in the exile community and the echoing made by the US government 
with certain restraint and a subtle warning to both sides for not provoking any kind of 
unusual migration, the EU institutional structure offered a subdued message of 
observation. 
 
Although customary statements were expected for expressing diplomatic wishes for a fast 
recovery, there was a polite silence regarding the political evolution of the regime. No 
explicit declarations of (unnecessary) support for the temporary heir were detected. In 
some countries where Cuban affairs have become in recent years a domestic issue, such 
as the notorious case of Spain, the expected gentle diplomatic comments made by high 
officials were met by a round of critical evaluations by the opposition. 
 
In general, it is safe to say that a consensus of caution developed showing that no political 
faction of sector wanted to be on record as contributing to the worsening of the situation. 
With the exception of the vocal commentaries made by second level figures of the PP and 
the leadership of Izquierda Unida (defending the ‘conquests’ of the Castro revolution), the 
attitude in Spain was prudent and respectful. Any other more active pattern could be 
interpreted as meddling in the internal matters of a country in a delicate situation. In more 
concrete terms, Spain’s foreign minister Miguel Angel Moratinos wished the recovery to 
Castro, while Spain’s ambassador in Havana, Carlos Alonso Zaldívar, in Havana 
reiterated that the future of Cuba will be determined ‘by Cubans and only by Cubans’. The 
PSOE spokesman in the Spanish Parliament was unusually blunt when he shared his 
party’s wish for Cuba ‘to direct itself towards full democracy, that today does not exist’, 
and that process should be done ‘without external interfering of any sort’. For its part, the 
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PP representatives called the Castro regime ‘an hereditary dictatorship’ and demanded of 
the Spanish government a clear message to Cuba for betting for a pacific transition’.144
 
On the business and tourism front, reactions to Castro’s illness news were prudent and 
did not show any noticeable concern for changes. While plans for tourist travel to Cuba 
were not affected in the heavy season of the month of August, business sectors evaluated 
as secured important investments made in Cuba, still under the impact of the apparent 
strategy executed in 2005 by the Cuban government for priming large companies instead 
of small and medium enterprises. It was then recorded that 99 joint businesses were 
cancelled and 67 were scheduled to be terminated.145 However, the new crisis did not 
seem to raise fears in the important Spanish businesses established in Cuba. Trade 
balance in 2005 was extremely positive for Spain: while Cuba sold €137.8 million of goods 
to Spain, it imported €488 million. More than 200 small and medium enterprises from 
Spain still operate in Cuba, while large conglomerates such as Melià, Altadis, and Repsol 
show an increase in the activities in the hotel and tobacco  and oil exploration 
industries.146
 
It is in this pragmatic and market-oriented context where the current state of the relations 
between Spain and Cuba take a new profile facing the uncertainties posed by the Castro’s 
illness and impasse. Reflecting a wide range of analytical approach by a number of 
scholars and think-tank staff, samples of documents stress that there was never the 
intention of the ‘creative and critical engagement and dialogue’ with Cuba to generate a 
change of regime, but still a sense of dissatisfaction exists in the minds of the high 
echelons of the Spanish government. Facing this dilemma, under the accusation of the 
PP that the open dialogue policy espoused by the PSOE-led administration, two 
alternatives are presented, further dramatized in the new panorama presented after 31 
July. The first is a return to the policy of the subtle and vocal policy of pressure applied in 
the last years of the Aznar administration and most especially from mid 2003 to mid 2004. 
It is valued as unrealistic and it would mean that in order to be coherent it should also to 
be applied to varied regimes that violate human rights equally or worse than in Cuba. The 
alternative of a withdrawal of an active policy towards Cuba is contrary to the historical 
links. However, while Spain is probably the country in the world that has the highest 
number of experts in a variety of Cuban fields, there is not a definite policy and strategy 
towards Cuba that matches intimate links that unite both civil societies (or traces of it).147 
The time may have come, in view of the novel panorama posed by the expectations 
towards a real transition, for the construction of an individualized approach to a new 
Cuba. This may be perfectly in tune with a new EU attitude. 
 
11. The EU Wish Castro and Cuban Democracy a Speedy Recovery 
 
EU spokesmen and other anonymous staff members reaffirmed a scrupulous policy of 
caution, coinciding with one of the strategies expressed by the US government on the 
need to avoid any source of a chaotic development that would provoke a massive exodus. 
Reminding observers that the EU had agreed to draft a long-term strategy paper, this was 
seen now even more difficult than before the Castro crisis, with countries such as the 
Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia pressuring for a position closer to the United State 
attitude. In spite of the persuasion executed by Spain, the Cuban govern has shown ‘an 
incapacity or unwillingness to evolve toward democracy’. In spite of this, the EU will be 
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always ready to help the Cuban people ‘in the event that it asks for assistance’. However, 
the EU does not wish the Cuban regime ‘to succeed itself’. Given a choice, Brussels 
would like to be able to work with the most moderate sector of the Cuban government, but 
is does no hold high hopes for a China solution, because Cuba ‘does not have the 
economic capacity and its geographical closeness to the United States’ is a factor to 
consider. The consensus to be built is then to maintain the communication channels open 
with the government and the opposition. It is taken for granted that the drafting of a new 
position would irritate the government, because the EU has not declared a common 
position on any other Latin American country. But Brussels is conscious that it has to send 
a clear message to Cuba and the exiles, in addition of the fact that it has given the country 
around €145 billion in assistance since 1993.148 However, the spokesman of the 
European Commission Pietro Petrucci made the most innovative and explicit statement. 
He surprised and amused the Brussels-accredited press by stating that ‘the EU desires to 
President Castro and Cuban democracy a speedy recovery’.149
 
For his part, Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, advises ‘serenity’ and expressed his hope for a transition that should be 
‘acceptable and correct’. The EU Council staff worked during the month of August on a 
draft for the new strategy document, but it was not expected to be discussed until the first 
External Relations meeting at the beginning of September under the EU presidency held 
by Finland.150 The EU Parliament was not in session while its most important 
representatives regarding relations with Latin America were in Colombia meeting with 
their counterparts of several integration systems in the formation of the Euro-Latin 
American Parliamentary Assembly. 
 
In any event, still taking into account the new variable inserted by the Castro’s illness and 
temporary withdrawal from active power, some standing pieces should be part of the 
analysis and have considerable place in the framing of the new strategy. First, the fact 
remains that the lack of consensus within the EU is not reduced to one country (Spain that 
wishes to move into a given direction for reasons of historical linkages, political and 
economic concerns, and the rest that seem not to have a special stake on Cuba. 
According to a keen analysis provided by Madrid-based Susanne Gratius, the line up can 
be subdivided into four teams: (1) the advocates of human rights (Northen Europe and the 
Netherlands), with a policy on Cuba based on principles; (2) the ‘engaged’ (Belgium, 
Spain, France, Italy and Portugal), favoring dialogue and discarding the conflictive 
measures imposed in 2003; (3) the ‘atlanticists’ (the UK, Germany and Austria), critical of 
Cuba, an issue not worth a conflict with the United States; and (4) the ‘hardliners’ (the 
new members from Eastern Europe, led by the Czech Republic), favoring sanctions, in 
line with US policy).151 While each sector will exercise its own influence, the final approach 
will have to reflect the considerable weigh of the conservative majority of the European 
Parliament. 
 
However, the final shape of resolutions and positions generated by the Council do not 
necessarily reflect the results of an open vote, but also reveal the energy and pressure 
applied by some specific members. The same way that the Common Position decided in 
1996 was a reflection of the individual role played by Spain under the leadership of Aznar, 
nowadays it is also the Spanish government that takes the front seat. While the Cuban 
issue gives an opportunity to Spanish parties to use it as a domestic topic, the behavior of 
the Castro regime also gives an excuse to countries that have no direct stake on Cuba. 
Weather one likes a specific policy of a given country or not, the objective cultural and 
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historical close links enjoyed by some (such is the case of Spain) make them 
irreplaceable partners for actions in a pre-transition strategy. This is the reason why 
seasoned observers have already pointed out that in the context of the need for the 
United States to seek the help of Europe and Latin America, Bush has now a golden 
opportunity to reformat the badly damaged relationship with Spain’s Rodríguez Zapatero 
and join efforts in addressing the sensitive issue of Cuba.152
 
This current panorama leaves the EU with three instruments to be used dealing with 
Havana: a conditioned political dialogue, economic and tourism links, and development 
aid. Until the Castro’s crisis, it was obvious that the first and the third were rejected by the 
Cubans, leaving only the second that is actually shared by all the European actors. The 
new scene available by the crisis presents the question about with whom in Cuba the 
European interests will deal. The enigma resides on knowing if the military will be running 
the show and effectively as they have been in recent years controlling most of the state 
enterprises. As with most things related to the Europe-Cuba relationship, only time will 
say if the approach was correct or doomed to failure as the historical US embargo policy. 
 
As a reflection of the special attitude of Spain on Cuba, it was not surprising that, after 
recovering from the stunning news, the Spanish press reacted with considerable 
commentaries and analysis, incorporating a wide range of views from insiders, residents, 
and foreign writers, with due priority given to Cubans in Miami, Spain and even in Cuba 
itself, some under the cover of pseudonyms.153 An exceptional piece was published by US 
ambassador in Madrid, Eduardo Aguirre, a Houston businessman of Cuban birth, named 
by Bush to deal with the sensitive US-Spain relations after the war in Iraq.154 Editorials in 
the mainstream press offered a notable consensus with an impressive absence of any 
kind words for a regime that appeared to be with no future. Expressions using a 
systematic labeling of ‘dictatorship’ were not limited to the conservative and middle of the 
way press, but they were used prominently in newspapers with progressive and moderate 
leftist inclinations. In this context, observers will find it veryt useful the constant updating 
of the digital edition of the journal Encuentro, published in Madrid. Although designed and 
managed by Cubans, it incorporates views of Latin American and Spanish writers.155 The 
nature of the ‘biological change’ was stressed heavily, while blame for the uncertainty of 
the future was placed on Castro’s resistance to change and reform.156
 
‘Eclipse of the patriarch’ was the innovative title of an editorial of the influential of Madrid’s 
El País, in which a generalized Spanish opinion was summarized outlining some of the 
reasons for the survival of the regime: the extraordinary internal conditions of Cuba, its 
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proximity to the United States, the US embargo that rendered cohesion to the Castro 
strategy, internal mobilization with the opposition rudely controlled, and most recently 
Castro’s popular prestige in Latin America reinforced by a wave of populism. However, 
the editorial ended by assessing that ‘Castroism without Castro’ is unfeasible, and it is in 
the interest of all actors to contribute so that the process now open be pacific and 
controlled by all Cubans. It added that the Cuban Communist party and the White House 
agree on the need to avoid chaos and a possible migratory avalanche.157 Reflecting what 
may be a fitting epitaph, and depending on future developments, another editorial of El 
País considered the temporary disappearance as an ‘irreversible event’, with lasting 
consequences. This feeling was widely shared by influential columnist and observers in 
Europe, Latin America and the United States.158 It is for this reason that it expressed a 
wide sense of opinion in Europe to call for prudence in the exile community, because 
there is going to be transition sooner or later. And efforts should be disposed to help for 
‘Castroism, after a violent trajectory, ends at least in a peaceful way, giving way to 
reconciliation and democracy’.159
 
12. Conclusion: Last and Least? 
 
The relationship between the European Union and Cuba, sometimes under the leading 
role of Spain and the cameo appearances of other EU governments, most especially the 
Czech, went into a stalemate after the suspension of the measures imposed in 2003. The 
results expected from the reinstatement of a communications lines between the Cuban 
regime and European actors were not materialized regarding an expansion of the release 
of political prisoners and other reform measures in the political behavior of the Castro 
government. The Cuban government seemed to be more interested in concrete tactics to 
obtain some specific benefits (such as a positive vote in the UN Human Rights 
Commission) and in its insistence in demonstrating that it would welcome any kind of 
conditioned assistance. 
 
While this overall strategy was not a novelty and it faithfully matched past behavior, it was 
further dramatized when apparently the diplomatic movements taken by Havana took a 
definite Latin American turn when Castro forged an alliance with Venezuela. The swap of 
social services given by Cuba and the oil provided by Chávez made the difference. The 
new setting was then choreographed by the attendance of Castro (a first in months to any 
international gathering) to the debut of Hugo Chávez in MERCOSUR, after he suddenly 
decided to leave the Andean Community. When this new trend seemed to disturb lightly 
the stalemate of the EU-Cuba relations and the Brussels establishment had decided to 
draft a new strategy towards Cuba to complete the existing Common Position of 2003, the 
illness and temporary retirement of Fidel Castro forced all actors, and most especially 
Spain in the case of the paper, to rethink their overall policies and ponder the appropriate 
actions to be taken. 
 
The initial reactions and possible the nucleus of a future policy reflect the basic points of 
the Common Position and are precisely summarized in the words of the spokesman of the 
Commission: the EU wishes Castro and Cuban democracy a speedy recovery. This 
protocol attitude (mostly on the first item) and sentiment (directly linked to the second) is 
shared by most of the European governments, and most specifically by the Spanish, for 
reasons explained above. Once the enigma of Castro’s health is clarified, the EU will 
address how to deal with the second political wish. While the consensus on this second 
aim is general, the different opinions on how to deal with its outcome will depend on the 
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circumstances. In principle, it is expected that governments such as the Czech and the 
Polish will continue to recommend strategies closer to the US policy, but all depends too 
on the interests of Washington facing the evolution of Castro’s health and the succession 
or transition routes.160 Although it is not clear and hard to predict the actual shape of such 
cooperation, it is reassuring that in the framework envisioned by the State Department 
there is role to be played by the EU. Thomas Shannon, the US State Department's 
assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs, was explicit in one of the rare 
references directly to the EU, in the course of a televised conference with an audience in 
Prague: ‘The European Union and other members of the global community can play an 
important role in helping Cuba make a transition to democracy’.161 Meanwhile, it is 
expected that Brussels will recommend a high degree of caution. In the first place, 
because it is too late to change the historical attitude towards Cuba, on the grounds that it 
has not failed, but only has caused a certain degree of frustration. Only time will say if the 
decision to maintain close communication with the Cuban government and people was 
the correct choice. Only when Cuba is fully under a democratic government and the 
people are able to freely express opinions, can judgment be rendered on the goodness of 
the European attitude compared with the US policy. 
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